The Design Of International Trade Agreements

In fact, comprehensive free trade agreements have an average transition period of 5.7 years in our dataset, compared to 1.7 for partial trade agreements. Customs unions also have a relatively long transition period of 4.5 years. Mansfield, E., Milner, H., Rosendorff, P. (2002). Why democracies collaborate more: electoral control and international trade agreements. International Organization, 56.3, 477-514. The supplementary agreements that were concluded at the WTO were not notified to the WTO and therefore could not be included in many of the SAA data sets based on the WTO list of PTAs. Magee, C.S.P. (2008). New measures to create trade and reorient trade. Journal of International Economics, 75, 349-362. Smith, J.M (2000). Dispute settlement policy: declaration of legalism in regional trade pacts.

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Busch, M. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping and dispute resolution in international trade. International Organization, 61(4), 735-61. Manger, M. (2009). Investing in protection: the policy of preferential trade agreements between the North and the South. ==Web links==== individual credentials == Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D. (2001). Rationalization of international institutions. International Organization, 55(4), 761-99.

Maggi, G., &Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007). A political-economic theory of trade agreements. American Economic Review, 97(4), 1374-1406. Helpman, E., Melitz, M., Rubenstein, Y. (2008). Estimation of trade flows: trading partners and volume of trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 441-487. Baier, S., &Bergstrand, J. (2007). Do free trade agreements really increase members` international trade? Journal of International Economics, 71(1), 72-95.

Preferential agreements (ASPT) have multiplied over the last twenty years. A great literature has studied different aspects of this phenomenon. However, until recently, many Large N studies have hardly drawn attention to the differences between PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new dataset on the design of trade agreements, which is the most comprehensive, both in terms of coded variables and covered agreements. We will illustrate the usefulness of the dataset in the new page of the question of whether and to what extent SAAs influence trade flows. The analysis shows that ATPs increase trade flows on average, but that this effect is largely due to deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that provisions on cross-border regulation are important for trade flows. However, the contribution of the dataset is not limited to the ZEP literature. Broader debates on issues such as the organisation of institutions and the legalisation of international relations will also benefit from the new data.

What does economics think about the development of international trade agreements? We read a literature on this issue and cover in detail three essential features of gatt/WTO: reciprocity, non-discrimination, as enshrined in the principle of the highest remuneration, and customs commitments and mandatory “surpluses”. Each of these characteristics is essential to the organisation of the GATT/WTO and we argue that an economic perspective can go a long way in highlighting a coherent logic for the integration of these characteristics into trade agreements. . . .

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